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INTRODUCTION 
In January 2008, the New York Times reported a story about 
major luxury goods retailers, like Saks Fifth Avenue and Bergdorf 
Goodman, and their imposition of limitations on the number of 
handbags and shoes a consumer could purchase online.
1
  Taking 
advantage of a weakened dollar, tourists were buying multiples of 
luxury items, which they could then resell in their home countries 
at a lower cost than local retail prices, but still at a substantial 
markup from the American price.
2
  This allowed the tourists to 
make a profit, and sometimes even to recuperate all of their travel 
expenses.
3
  A few years earlier, the Economist reported that an 
entire industry was developing in Asia, where, in exchange for an 
all-expenses-paid trip to the European capitals, tour ―bosses‖ hired 
travelers to purchase multiples of handbags and other luxury goods 
from upmarket retailers.
4
 
Although luxury goods arbitrage, both small scale and large, 
had been common throughout Europe for many years, at the time 
 
 1 Eric Wilson, No More Bags for You!, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 2008, at G1, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/10/fashion/10CAPS.html?pagewanted=all. 
 2 Id. 
 3 Id. 
 4 A Different Kind of Package Holiday, ECONOMIST, July 12, 2001, available at 
http://www.economist.com/node/693553. 
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that American retailers began imposing limitations on these goods, 
this was a new phenomenon for the United States.
5
  Prior to the 
adoption of the Euro, tourists generally found deals in Europe, 
where local currencies were low in value relative to the dollar.  
The dollar‘s decline, however, began to shift the origin of gray 
market goods
6
 to the United States.
7
  Although the phenomenon 
described by both the New York Times and the Economist 
involved goods ultimately resold abroad, American merchants, like 
the tourists and tour ―bosses‖ featured in the articles, also use price 
discrimination to make a profit.
8
  By purchasing goods intended 
for sale in a foreign market, they may resell these goods 
domestically at a lower price than their counterparts sold in local 
retail.
9
  The arbitrageurs thus benefit based on the difference in 
price of the goods across markets. 
Because gray market arbitrage of luxury goods no longer 
occurs exclusively abroad,
10
 American luxury goods manufacturers 
have searched for a legal means to control the distribution of these 
products domestically.
11
  While the development of a gray market 
 
 5 See Wilson, supra note 1, at G1.  
6  Black‘s Law Dictionary defines the ―gray market‖ as ―a market in which the seller 
uses legal but sometimes unethical methods to avoid a manufacturer's distribution chain 
and thereby sell goods (esp. imported goods) at prices lower than those envisioned by the 
manufacturer.‖ See BLACK‘S LAW DICTIONARY 3076 (8th ed. 2005).  Black‘s also makes a 
reference to ―gray market goods‖ within its definition of ―gray market,‖ although it does 
not provide a formal definition:  
One of the most controversial areas of customs law concerns ―gray 
market goods,‖ goods produced abroad with authorization and 
payment but which are imported into unauthorized markets.  Trade in 
gray market goods has increased dramatically in recent years, in part 
because fluctuating currency exchange rates create opportunities to 
import and sell such goods at a discount rate from local price levels.  
Id. (quoting RALPH H. FOLSOM & MICHAEL W. GORDON, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 
TRANSACTIONS § 20.8 (1995)).  Gray market goods are often referred to as ―parallel 
imports.‖ See Parfums Givenchy, Inc. v. Drug Emporium, Inc., 38 F.3d 477, 481 n.6 (9th 
Cir. 1994) (citing K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 286–87 (1987)).    
 7 See Wilson, supra note 1, at G1. 
 8 Kristi Ellis, Supreme Court Backs Ruling on Costco Copyright Case, WOMEN‘S 
WEAR DAILY (Dec. 13, 2010), http://wwd.com/business-news/legal/supreme-court-backs-
ruling-on-costco-copyright-case-3402860; see also David Pierson, Made in China But 
Pricier There; A Nation That Delivers Low-Cost Goods to the West Doesn’t Always Do 
the Same for Its Own People, L.A. TIMES, July 13, 2010, at A1.  
 9 Ellis, supra note 8. 
 10 Pierson, supra note 8.  
11  Id. 
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indicates increased demand for their products, luxury brand owners 
strive to prevent a market flooded with their designs and to avoid a 
shift in the public‘s perception of their brand.12  In Europe, policy 
makers are friendly to luxury companies and have allowed them to 
impose vertical restraints on, for example, the outlets where their 
goods may be sold.
13
  However, the United States does not provide 
this degree of protection.
14
  Some luxury goods companies, such as 
the watchmaker Tag Heuer, have taken a proactive approach: to 
control distribution, slow-selling products are repurchased and 
funneled into the company‘s outlet stores.15  Others, however, turn 
to intellectual property law—for example copyright law—to 
control distribution channels and prevent the unauthorized resale of 
their goods.  This Note will focus on brand owners‘ use of 
copyright law as a means of controlling channels of distribution. 
Through section 109(a) of the Copyright Act of 1976,
16
 
Congress attempted to set guidelines specifying when the 
purchaser of a copyrighted good may resell or redistribute that 
good.  Section 109(a) is known as the first sale doctrine, and 
provides a defense to these resellers in a copyright infringement 
action.  This Note will discuss the first sale doctrine as codified in 
section 109(a) and its applicability to goods sold in the gray 
market.  Part I provides background on the first sale doctrine and 
discusses the constitutional basis for and origins of the Copyright 
Act of 1976 and the distribution right.  Then, this Part explains the 
Supreme Court‘s understanding of the statute, and last describes 
the current conflicting interpretations of the statute by the Second 
Circuit and the Ninth Circuit.  Part II compares and contrasts the 
Second Circuit and Ninth Circuit‘s standards of review for 
applying the first sale doctrine.  Part III identifies weaknesses in 
both standards and proposes a new, tripartite framework for 
 
 12 Id. 
 13 See Geoffrey A. Fowler & Max Colchester, Corporate News: In Europe, EBay 
Gains in Fights Over Fakes, WALL ST. J., May 26, 2009, at B4. 
 14 For example, trademark law does not provide protection for gray market goods 
arbitrage. See, e.g., Tiffany Inc. v. eBay Inc., 600 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 
131 S. Ct. 647 (2010) (holding that trademark owners, not online marketplaces, have the 
burden of policing items sold on such outlets).  
 15 Joelle Diderich, Tag Heuer Ticks to 150, WOMEN‘S WEAR DAILY (Apr. 19, 2010), 
http://www.wwd.com/accessories-news/watches/tag-heuer-ticks-to-150-3043836. 
 16 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2006). 
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analyzing the first sale doctrine.  In Part IV, this Note concludes by 
explaining why the alternative proposed in Part III is more 
desirable than the current interpretations of the statute by the 
circuit courts. 
I. THE FIRST SALE DOCTRINE IN THE CONTEXT OF GRAY MARKET 
GOODS 
Section A focuses on the common law and statutory origins of 
the first sale doctrine, tracking its evolution from the Supreme 
Court‘s first iteration of the doctrine in Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. 
Straus
17
 to its current form in the Copyright Act of 1976.
18
  Section 
B discusses Supreme Court, Second Circuit, and Ninth Circuit 
jurisprudence regarding gray market goods. 
A. The First Sale Doctrine: Common Law and Statutory Origins 
1. Constitutional Origins and the Distribution Right 
a) Legal Background 
The Constitution empowers Congress to stimulate innovation; 
specifically, ―[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, 
by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the 
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.‖19  
Congress achieves this Constitutional goal through the Copyright 
Act.
20
  The basic rights granted to every copyrighted work are 
codified in the first three clauses of section 106 of the Copyright 
Act: (1) the right of reproduction;
21
 (2) the right of adaptation;
22
 
and (3) the right of distribution.
23
   
The distribution right in section 106(3) gives a copyright owner 
the exclusive right ―to distribute copies or phonorecords of the 
 
 17 210 U.S. 339 (1908). 
 18 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2006). 
 19 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.  Congress invoked this phrase in the first paragraph of 
the House Report discussing the development of the Copyright Act of 1976. H.R. REP. 
NO. 94-1476, at 5659 (1976). 
 20 17 U.S.C. §§ 101 et. seq. (2006). 
 21 Id. § 106(1). 
 22 Id. § 106(2). 
 23 Id. § 106(3).  
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copyrighted work to the public by sale or other transfer of 
ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending.‖24  The distribution right 
is fundamental to an author‘s or an inventor‘s exclusive right to her 
work.
25
  Without the distribution right, a copyright holder would 
have recourse for the sale or transfer of unauthorized copies of her 
work, but would not be able to control the distribution of lawfully 
created works that were later wrongfully obtained.
26
  Control over 
infringing importation, which some courts have viewed as an 
extension of the distribution right,
27
 is given to an author or an 
inventor by section 602(a),
28
 which provides that an unauthorized 
importation of copyrighted materials is an infringement of the 
exclusive right to distribute under section 106(3).
29
  The right to 
control importation is, in essence, contained in the right to 
distribute copies from a foreign country into the United States.
30
 
 However, a copyright holder‘s distribution right does not 
include or automatically create a right to impose limitations on the 
distribution of an item after the copyright holder‘s first disposition 
of the item.
31
  A copyright holder‘s rights under section 106 are 
bookended by the defenses enumerated in sections 107 through 
122, including the first sale doctrine.
32
  As codified in section 
 
 24 Id. 
 25 See id. § 602(a) (2006); see also 2-8 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, 
NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8.12[A] (2011) [hereinafter NIMMER].  Additionally, section 
602(a) of the Copyright Act extends a copyright holder‘s distribution right to foreign-
manufactured goods by stating that unauthorized importation of a good is an infringement 
of the right to distribute conferred by section 106(3).  
 26 See NIMMER, supra note 25, § 8.12[A]. 
 27 See, e.g., L‘Anza Research Int‘l, Inc. v. Quality King Distrib., Inc., 98 F.3d 1109, 
1115–16 (9th Cir. 1996) (concluding, like Sebastian Int’l, Inc. v. Consumer Contacts 
(PTY) Ltd., 847 F.2d 1093 (3d Cir. 1996), that unauthorized importation under section 
602(a) constitutes a type of infringement of the distribution right codified in section 
106(3)). 
 28 See 17 U.S.C. § 602(a) (2006).  Section 602(a) provides:  
Infringing importation or exportation.– 
(1) Importation.–Importation into the United States, without the 
authority of the owner of copyright under this title, of copies or 
phonorecords of a work that have been acquired outside the United 
States is an infringement of the exclusive right to distribute copies or 
phonorecords under section 106, actionable under section 501.  
 29 Id. 
 30 See 17 U.S.C. § 106(3); NIMMER, supra note 25, § 8.12[A]. 
 31 See Bobbs-Merill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339, 350–51 (1908).  
 32 Id. 
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109(a) of the Copyright Act of 1976,
33
 the first sale doctrine 
functions as a defense to an action alleging infringement of the 
section 106(3) distribution right.
34
  A future seller of a particular 
copy may raise the first sale doctrine as a defense if the copyright 
holder initiates an infringement action in response to the sale of an 
item.
35
  The first sale doctrine provides that once a copyright 
holder has made and sold her copies, she has transferred her title to 
that copy, she has received her reward through the purchase price 
of that sale, and she has thereby relinquished all further rights to 
sell or dispose of that copy.
36
  The first sale doctrine therefore caps 
the distribution right bestowed on a copyright owner because it 
terminates the copyright holder‘s distribution right following the 
first sale.
37
  Through this elimination, section 109(a) allows for the 
creation of what is known as the gray market.
38
  ―Gray market 
goods,‖ or ―parallel imports,‖ are genuine products possessing a 
brand name protected by a trademark or copyright sold by an 
individual who is not the intellectual property owner or someone 
licensed by the owner.
39
  They are often purchased and imported 
into the United States by third parties following a first sale by the 
copyright holder, and thereby bypass distribution channels 
normally employed by copyright holders.
40
 
 
33  See 17 U.S.C. § 109(a). 
34  See id. § 106(3); NIMMER, supra note 25, § 8.12[A]. 
 35 See id. 
 36 See Quality King Distrib., Inc. v. L‘anza Research Int‘l, Inc., 523 U.S. 135, 152 
(1998); see also Sebastian Int‘l, Inc. v. Consumer Contacts (PTY) Ltd., 847 F.2d 1093, 
1098–99 (3d Cir. 1988).  A copyright holder who has sold a particular copy will not 
necessarily have privity of contract with the future purchaser or seller of item, so giving a 
copyright holder a right to distribute beyond the first sale of the item would in effect give 
her the power to control the decisions of another merchant. See Bobbs-Merill Co., 210 
U.S. at 350. 
 37 See 17 U.S.C. §§ 106(a), 109(a); NIMMER, supra note 25. 
 38 See Quality King, 523 U.S. at 153. 
 39 See Parfums Givenchy, Inc. v. Drug Emporium, Inc., 38 F.3d 477, 481 n.6 (9th Cir. 
1994) (citing K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 286–87 (1987)). 
 40 See id. 
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b) Economic Context 
The luxury goods industry thrives on the distribution right.
41
  A 
luxury product company develops a caché through its ability to 
control its ―brand image,‖ namely, the emotional or psychological 
associations that a consumer may have with a product or brand.
42
  
Brand owners, especially those engaged in the production of 
luxury goods, spend millions of dollars annually on marketing their 
products as prestigious.
43
  What may turn a product into a brand is 
the way in which it is presented in the market, including its 
packaging and point-of-sale support.
44
  However, unlike the brand 
owner, gray market resellers of luxury goods do not have the same 
interest in maintaining the visceral effect that creates a luxury 
goods brand.
45
  For this reason, outside of the brand owner‘s 
control, the goods may no longer convey the same prestige or 
appeal.
46
  Absent emotional appeal, brand image deteriorates.
47
  
Moreover, goods sold in the gray market are difficult to track and 
thus disrupt companies‘ marketing strategies and profit 
performance models.
48
  Forecasting sales and merchandising 
becomes challenging, and due to increased competition from 
imported gray market goods, domestic employment in the luxury 
goods industry may decrease.
49
  A brand‘s ability to predict the 
enforceability of its distribution right will decrease transactional 
costs and allow a company to understand how it may best allocate 
its resources.
50
 
 
 41 See Alvin G. Galstian, Comment, Protecting Against the Gray Market in the New 
Economy, 22 LOY. L.A. INT‘L & COMP. L. REV. 507, 510–12 (2000). 
 42 Id. (referencing Roderick White, What Can Advertising Really Do for Brands?, 18 
INT‘L J. ADVERTISING 3, 3–4 (1999)).  
 43 Id. 
 44 Roderick White, What Can Advertising Really Do for Brands?, 18 INT‘L J. 
ADVERTISING 3, 5 (1999). 
 45 See Galstian, supra note 41, at 511–12.  
 46 See id. at 512. 
 47 Id.  
 48 See Paul Lansing & Joseph Gabriella, Clarifying Gray Market Gray Areas, 31 AM. 
BUS. L.J. 313, 316 (1993).  
 49 Id. 
 50 See Joseph Karl Grant, The Graying of the American Manufacturing Economy: Gray 
Markets, Parallel Importation, and a Tort Law Approach, 88 OR. L. REV. 1139, 1140–41 
(2009); Christine Ongchin, Price Discrimination in the Textbook Market: An Analysis of 
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For a consumer, the availability of goods sold on the gray 
market may produce both desirable and undesirable effects.  
Because they increase competition in the market among sellers and 
outlets of the same goods, gray market goods benefit consumers by 
lowering the price point.
51
  At the same time, a consumer may be 
dissatisfied by a good manufactured for sale abroad because of 
differing design, quality levels, warranty coverage, or intended 
usage.
52
  Moreover, a brand‘s existing customers may become 
dissatisfied because of an increased supply of the product on the 
market—established consumers of a brand may find that their 
goods are no longer exclusive.  Thus, in order to protect herself, as 
well as to protect customer satisfaction, the owner of a brand may 
seek to control the distribution of her goods using intellectual 
property law.  Copyright law has been employed to protect 
marketing channels because, as explained below, it provides 
control over the distribution of goods in a way that trademark law 
does not.  Specifically, in trademark law, even if a brand is 
protected by the Lanham Act, the resale of genuine trademarked 
goods by a third party vendor, even if unauthorized, does not 
constitute trademark infringement.
53
  The Lanham Act strives to 
prevent brand confusion; so long as the goods are genuine, 
consumers are not misled.
54
   
Although like the Copyright Act, the Lanham Act provides a 
mechanism for intellectual property owners to control the 
distribution of goods bearing their mark, trademark law is unique 
in that it provides a loophole for the entry into the United States of 
some goods that may not have been authorized for importation.  
Like section 602 of the Copyright Act of 1976, section 526 of the 
 
the Post-Quality King Proposals to Prevent and Disincentivize Reimportation and 
Arbitrage, 15 CARDOZO J. INT‘L & COMP. L. 223, 240–41 (2007). 
 51 See Lansing & Gabriella, supra note 48, at 315.  
 52 Brief of Am. Watch Ass‘n as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent at 3, 
Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Omega, S.A., 131 S. Ct. 565 (2010) (No. 08-1423), 2010 WL 
3501176. 
 53 See Trademark Act of 1946 § 42(1)(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a) (2006).  Note that a 
company may use its trademark to prevent unauthorized importation of a trademarked 
good through Section 526 of the Tariff Act, which prohibits the importation of 
trademarked goods without explicit written consent of the trademark owner. 19 U.S.C. § 
1526 (2006).  
 54 See Trademark Act of 1946 § 42(1)(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a). 
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Lanham Act prohibits the unauthorized importation of trademarked 
goods.
55
  However, its corresponding federal regulation, 19 C.F.R. 
§ 133.23, grants the Customs Service the ability to allow the entry 
of foreign trademarked goods following a 30-day detention period 
if the owner of the trademark is the same business entity as the 
owner of the domestic trademark or the parent company or 
subsidiary of the owner of the domestic trademark.
56
  This 
regulation also does not bar the importation of a good 
manufactured abroad and imported without the authorization of the 
trademark owner, as long as the trademark is genuine and the 
goods are not physically or materially different from those 
authorized for importation by the domestic trademark owner.
57
  
Unlike the first sale doctrine of copyright law, the regulations 
pertaining to the importation of trademarked goods do not require a 
showing that a lawful first sale has occurred.  Thus, trademark law 
does not provide a brand owner with the same recourse to control 
channels of sale, and thereby preserve brand image, as the 
distribution right in copyright law.   
 
55  See 19 U.S.C. § 1526(a) (2006).  
56  See 19 C.F.R. § 133.21(c) (2012). 
(d) Relief from detention of gray market articles. Gray market goods 
subject to the restrictions of this section shall be detained for 30 days 
from the date on which the goods are presented for Customs 
examination, to permit the importer to establish that any of the 
following exceptions, as well as the circumstances described above in 
§ 133.22(c), are applicable: 
(1) The trademark or trade name was applied under the authority of a 
foreign trademark or trade name owner who is the same as the U.S. 
owner, a parent or subsidiary of the U.S. owner, or a party otherwise 
subject to common ownership or control with the U.S. owner (in an 
instance covered by §§ 133.2(d) and 133.12(d) of this part); and/or 
(2) For goods bearing a genuine mark applied under the authority of 
the U.S. owner, a parent or subsidiary of the U.S. owner, or a party 
otherwise subject to common ownership or control with the U.S. 
owner, that the merchandise as imported is not physically and 
materially different, as described in § 133.2(e), from articles 
authorized by the U.S. owner for importation or sale in the United 
States; or 
(3) Where goods are detained for violation of § 133.23(a)(3), as 
physically and materially different from the articles authorized by the 
U.S. trademark owner for importation or sale in the U.S., a label in 
compliance with § 133.23(b) is applied to the goods.  
Id. § 133.23(d).  
57  Id. 
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2. Common Law Origins of the First Sale Doctrine: Bobbs-
Merrill Co. v. Straus 
In 1908, the Supreme Court had its first opportunity to evaluate 
the extent of a copyright holder‘s distribution right in Bobbs-
Merrill Co. v. Straus.
58
  In Bobbs-Merrill, a publishing company 
brought an infringement action against a vendor of its novel The 
Castaway.
59
  The vendor bought the books at wholesale and resold 
the majority of the copies at a price of eighty-nine cents per book.  
However, the following statement accompanied the copyright 
statement in each book: ―The price of this book at retail is one 
dollar net.  No dealer is licensed to sell it at a less price, and a sale 
at a less price will be treated as an infringement of the 
copyright.‖60  The Court held that this statement was 
unenforceable.
61
  The right to vend articulated by the 1790 
copyright law
62
 did not allow a copyright holder to restrict future 
sales of the book or to establish a certain price per copy, even if 
each copy contained a notice of a limitation on future sales.
63
  
Based on common law, the Court reasoned that the presence of a 
first sale and an intermediary retailer eliminated any privity 
between the copyright holder and the ultimate purchaser.
64
  More 
importantly, the relevant statute contained no right to control or 
restrict sales after the initial sale of a copyrighted item.
65
  Thus, the 
Court concluded that a copyright holder‘s distribution right ends at 
the first sale of the item.
66
  Cautioning that this was purely a 
question of statutory construction, the Court explained that it did 
not have the power to extend the right to vend to include a right to 
control future sales.
67
 
 
 58 210 U.S. 339, 343 (1908).  
 59 Id. at 341. 
 60 Id. at 341–42. 
 61 Id. at 350 (extending the first sale doctrine of patent law to copyright law).  
 62 Copyright Act of 1790, ch. 15, § 1, 1 Stat. 124 (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006)). 
 63 Bobbs-Merrill Co., 210 U.S. at 350. 
 64 Id. 
 65 Id. at 351. 
 66 Id. 
 67 Id.  
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3. Statutory Origin: From the Copyright Act of 1909 to the 
Copyright Act of 1976 
Following the Bobbs-Merrill decision in 1908, the first sale 
doctrine was codified in the Copyright Act of 1909.
68
  Under the 
1909 Act, the first sale doctrine operated similarly to its current 
iteration, limiting the distribution right by providing a defense to 
infringement following the first sale.
69
  The current form of the 
first sale doctrine adopted in section 109(a) of the Copyright Act of 
1976 states: ―the owner of a particular copy or phonorecord 
lawfully made under this title, or any person authorized by such 
owner, is entitled, without the authority of the copyright owner, to 
sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy or 
phonorecord.‖70  The statute‘s purpose and language generally 
matches that of the 1909 Act.
71
  However, the 1976 Act articulated 
an additional qualification an owner must meet in order for the first 
sale doctrine to apply—the copy must be ―lawfully made under 
this title.‖72  This phrase has been cause for debate in the circuit 
courts since the mid-1990s.  Courts have also questioned the 
relationship between section 109(a) and section 602(a), which 
delineates a copyright holder‘s right to control the importation of 
its goods.  As a result, the first sale doctrine has been a repeat topic 
of discussion in the circuit courts and for the Supreme Court in the 
past several years. 
 
B. The Supreme Court, the Second Circuit, and the Ninth Circuit 
Set the Parameters of the First Sale Doctrine for Gray Market 
Goods 
The next three subsections unpack the points of view of the 
Supreme Court and the circuit courts.  In addressing the 
applicability of section 109(a) to gray market goods, the courts 
have consistently held that the first sale doctrine applies to 
 
 68 Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, § 41, 35 Stat. 1075 (presently codified at 17 U.S.C. 
§ 109(a) (2006)). 
 69 See NIMMER, supra note 25, at § 8.12[B]. 
 70 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2006) (emphasis added). 
 71 H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 5693 (1976). 
 72 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2006). 
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domestically manufactured goods.
73
  This was the rule 
promulgated by the Supreme Court in Quality King Distributors, 
Inc. v. L’Anza Research International, Inc., which is explored in 
subsection 1.
74
  The Second Circuit treats this rule as exclusive; 
―lawfully made under this Title‖ means strictly domestically 
manufactured.
75
  The court reasoned that if section 109(a) were 
available to goods manufactured abroad and later imported, it 
would come into conflict with section 602(a), which protects a 
copyright holder‘s importation right.76  Subsection 2 explains how 
the Second Circuit arrived at this rule.  The Ninth Circuit, 
however, has argued that the practical consequences of limiting 
section 109(a) in such a way are too great to justify this reading of 
the section.
77
  As such, the Ninth Circuit developed an exception 
that makes section 109(a) an available defense for goods 
manufactured abroad, so long as the goods are subjected to a 
domestic first sale by a copyright holder.
78
  Subsection 3 discusses 
the development of the Ninth Circuit‘s exception. 
1. The Supreme Court Interprets Section 109(a): Quality King 
Distributors, Inc. v. L‘Anza 
The Supreme Court first discussed the question of whether the 
first sale doctrine is an available defense to resellers of gray market 
goods in Quality King Distributors, Inc. v. L’Anza Research 
International, Inc.
79
  In Quality King, bottles of shampoo affixed 
with copyrighted labels were manufactured in the United States, 
sold to a chain of foreign distributors, then reimported into the 
United States, and subsequently marketed for retail in the United 
 
 73 Quality King Distrib., Inc. v. L‘anza Research Int‘l, Inc., 523 U.S. 135, 145 (1998). 
 74 Id. 
 75 See John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Kirtsaeng, 654 F.3d 210, 221 (2d Cir. 2011), cert 
granted, 80 U.S.L.W. 3365 (U.S. Apr. 16, 2012) (No. 11-697). 
 76 Id. 
 77 See Denbicare U.S.A. Inc. v. Toys ―R‖ Us, Inc., 84 F.3d 1143, 1149–50 (9th Cir. 
1996); Parfums Givenchy, Inc. v. Drug Emporium, Inc., 38 F.3d 477, 481 (9th Cir. 
1994); BMG Music v. Perez, 952 F.2d 318, 319 (9th Cir. 1991). 
 78 See Denbicare, 84 F.3d at 1149–50; Givenchy, 38 F.3d at 480; BMG Music, 952 
F.2d at 319. 
 79 523 U.S. 135, 138 (1998).  To avoid confusion with the Ninth Circuit‘s decision 
with the same name, this case is referred to as Quality King in the body of this Note. 
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States by the defendant, Quality King.
80
  Quality King raised the 
first sale defense when L‘anza claimed a violation of its right to 
control distribution under section 106(3) and its right to control 
importation under section 602(a) of the Copyright Act.
81
 
At the appellate level, the Ninth Circuit held that the first sale 
doctrine did not provide a defense to Quality King.
82
  The court 
determined that using section 109(a) as a defense to a section 
602(a) claim would render section 602(a) meaningless, as section 
602(a) seeks to protect a copyright owner‘s control over 
importation of their goods.
83
  In studying the legislative history of 
section 602, the court concluded that Congress had intended to 
give copyright holders control over the distribution of gray market 
goods, and thus made section 109(a) completely unavailable to 
imported goods sold by third parties, regardless of their place of 
manufacture.
84
  However, this decision by the Ninth Circuit 
conflicted with a prior decision by the Third Circuit in a factually 
similar case, Sebastian International, Inc. v. Consumer Contacts 
(PTY) Ltd.
85
 
The Sebastian International court held that the first sale 
doctrine applies to domestically manufactured goods, regardless of 
 
 80 Id. at 138–39.  Specifically, the goods were sold to an importer in the United 
Kingdom, who had subsequently resold the bottles to a distributor in Malta, who in turn 
sold the goods to Quality King, who sold the goods in the United States. 
 81 Id. at 139–40; see also 17 U.S.C. §§ 106, 602(a) (2006). 
 82 See L‘Anza Research Int‘l, Inc. v. Quality King Distribs., Inc., 98 F.3d 1109, 1114 
(9th Cir. 1996), rev’d, 523 U.S. 135 (1998).  To avoid confusion with the Supreme 
Court‘s decision with the same name, this case is referred to as L’anza in the body of this 
Note. 
 83 Id. at 1117.  Because of its precedents, BMG Music and Givenchy, had been decided 
with respect to the tension between sections 109(a) and 602(a), the Ninth Circuit viewed 
this as the central conflict in L’anza rather than discussing whether the goods were 
―lawfully made under this Title.‖ BMG Music, 952 F.2d at 318–19 (―Copyright owners 
would no longer have an exclusive right to distribute copies or phonorecords of works 
manufactured abroad, an interest clearly protected by § 602.‖); Parfums Givenchy, 38 
F.3d at 481–82.  Left unresolved in that series of cases, this language has been the cause 
for disagreement in more recent cases in the Second Circuit and the Ninth Circuit. See 
generally John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Kirtsaeng, 654 F.3d 210 (2d Cir. 2011), cert 
granted, 80 U.S.L.W. 3365 (U.S. Apr. 16, 2012) (No. 11-697).; Omega, S.A. v. Costco 
Wholesale Corp., 541 F.3d 982 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 84 See L’Anza, 98 F.3d at 1115–17. 
 85 847 F.2d 1093, 1099 (1988).  
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their importation status.
86
  The Third Circuit concluded that section 
602(a) does not create a right in addition to those conferred by 
section 106(3); rather, unauthorized importation serves as an 
example of one type of infringement of the distribution right.
87
  
Additionally, the Third Circuit found that section 602(a) did not 
provide a remedy for the copyright holder against the unauthorized 
importation of goods manufactured under United States copyright 
law.
88
  Thus, according to the Sebastian International court, 
section 109(a) functions interdependently with section 602(a) and 
the first sale defense applies to domestically manufactured, 
reimported goods.
89
  Because the Ninth Circuit in L’anza reached 
the conflicting conclusion that the first sale doctrine could not be 
raised as a defense to the importation right, the Supreme Court 
granted certiorari.
90
 
Echoing Sebastian International, the Supreme Court decided in 
Quality King‘s favor.91  The Supreme Court found that section 
602(a) gives a copyright holder control over the importation of 
piratical copies in addition to control over the importation of 
copies that were lawfully made ―under the law of some other 
country.‖92  The latter category includes copies that are neither 
counterfeited nor ―lawfully made under [Title 17].‖93  As the Third 
 
 86 Id. at 1099. 
 87 Id. 
 88 Id.  
 89 Id.  
 90 Quality King Distribs., Inc. v. L‘anza Research Int‘l, Inc., 523 U.S. 135, 140 (1998) 
(―Because [the Ninth Circuit‘s] decision created a conflict with the Third Circuit, . . . we 
granted the petition for certiorari.‖); see also L‘Anza Research Int‘l, Inc. v. Quality King 
Distribs., Inc., 98 F.3d 1109, 1117 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that the first sale doctrine is 
not a viable defense for gray market goods); Sebastian Int’l, Inc., 847 F.2d at 1099  
(concluding that a manufacturer is barred by the first sale doctrine from establishing 
infringement through an unauthorized importation). 
 91 Quality King, 523 U.S. at 150–52. 
 92 See id. at 146–47.  Although L‘anza had argued that section 602(a) is superfluous 
unless it covers nonpiratical copies, the Court found that even if section 602(a) applied 
only to piratical copies, it would still provide a private remedy to supplement 
enforcement by customs codified in section 602(b).  Additionally, the first sale doctrine 
on its own does not provide a defense to a 602(a) action to a non-owner, such as a 
licensee, a bailee, or consignee. 
 93 Id. at 147.  Congress had contemplated that a ban on piratical copies should be 
extended to bar importation of a foreign edition when there is an agreement between a 
domestic and a foreign manufacturer to divide the distribution of a United States edition 
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Circuit explained, because section 109(a) limits the distribution 
right in section 106(3), section 109(a) may also apply to section 
602(a).
94
  However, section 602(a) prevents the importation of 
goods in a broader array of situations than those permitted by 
section 109(a), for example, the importation of piratical copies, 
section 109(a) does not completely subsume section 602(a).
95
  The 
Supreme Court further explained the relationship between the two 
sections through an illustration involving a British manufacturer of 
a book with exclusive distribution rights in Britain, and an 
American manufacturer of the same book with domestic 
distribution rights.
96
  The first sale doctrine would not permit the 
British manufacturer to resell in the United States the copies 
designed to be sold abroad, because, presumably, only the copies 
made by the United States publisher would be ―lawfully made 
under [Title 17]‖ and the right of distribution for only those copies 
would be limited by 109(a).
97
  This explanation led the Supreme 
Court to hypothesize in dicta that the copyright holder could 
potentially bring an infringement action and succeed if the foreign 
manufacturer attempted to resell its goods domestically.
98
 
Regardless of this theory, the shampoo bottles in Quality King 
were manufactured in the United States by L‘anza.99  Therefore, 
without addressing possible geographic implications of that phrase 
in its holding, the Court decided that the defendant was not 
infringing copyright by selling the goods in the United States 
because the goods were, under any interpretation of the phrase, 
―lawfully made under [Title 17].‖100  The copyright holder 
manufactured the shampoo bottles in the United States, so the 
 
and a foreign edition of the same work between themselves. See id. (quoting STAFF OF H. 
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 87th CONG., 1st SESS., COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION: REP. OF THE 
REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW 125–
26 (Comm. Print 1961)).  Note that without a market allocation agreement, presumably 
each publisher could make lawful copies. 
 94 Sebastian Int’l, Inc., 847 F.2d at 1099. 
 95 See Quality King, 523 U.S. at 146–47. 
 96 Id. at 148.  
 97 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Kirtsaeng, 654 F.3d 210, 218 (2011), cert granted, 80 
U.S.L.W. 3365 (U.S. Apr. 16, 2012) (No. 11-697) (citing Quality King, 523 U.S. at 148). 
 98 Quality King, 523 U.S. at 148. 
 99 Id. at 138. 
 100 Id. at 145. 
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phrase ―lawfully made under this Title‖ applied literally—there 
was no question as to whether the goods were subject to the 
provisions of the Copyright Act.
101
  The Court explained ―the 
whole point of the first sale doctrine‖: that a copyright holder 
exhausts statutory control over the distribution of a copyrighted 
good after that good is placed in the stream of commerce.
102
   
By mandating that the first sale doctrine applies to 
domestically manufactured goods despite their reimported status, 
the Supreme Court overturned the Ninth Circuit decision.
103
  The 
Court did not discuss the meaning of ―lawfully made under this 
Title‖; instead, its analysis of the applicability of section 109(a) 
was limited to the facts of the case.
104
  The defense granted by 
section 109(a) was available to Quality King due to the goods‘ 
manufacture and sale in the United States by L‘anza.105  For this 
reason, the Court‘s analysis did not consider whether the defense is 
available for foreign-manufactured goods. 
In her concurrence, Justice Ginsburg highlighted the limitation 
of the Court‘s holding to domestically manufactured goods and 
cautioned the lower courts that the dicta in Quality King had 
merely the force of dicta.
106
  Despite the fact that the Court‘s 
holding was limited exclusively to ―round trip‖ goods, other courts 
have used the British manufacturer hypothetical to determine 
section 109(a)‘s applicability to goods manufactured abroad.107   
2. The Second Circuit 
Quality King served as the basis for the general rule that the 
first sale doctrine applies only to domestically manufactured 
goods.  The Second Circuit adopted this rule in its most recent 
decision discussing section 109(a) and foreign manufactured 
goods, John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Kirtsaeng, decided in August 
 
 101 Id.  
 102 Id. at 152. 
 103 Id. at 145; see L‘anza Research Int‘l., Inc. v. Quality King Distribs., Inc., 98 F.3d 
1109, 1113–117 (9th Cir. 1996). 
 104 See Quality King, 523 U.S. at 145. 
 105 Id. at 145, 152. 
 106 Id. at 154 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
 107 See id. at 148; infra Part I.B.2. 
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2011.
108
  John Wiley & Sons filed a suit when it discovered that 
Kirtsaeng, who had emigrated from Thailand to pursue his 
education in the United States, had been engaging in arbitrage 
through the online resale of textbooks manufactured by the 
company‘s Asian subsidiary.109  Taking advantage of the lower 
price of textbooks manufactured abroad, Kirtsaeng resold in the 
United States books printed and sold in Asia by John Wiley & 
Sons (Asia) Pte Ltd.
110
  Using commercial websites such as eBay, 
Kirtsaeng generated a revenue of nearly $1.2 million over the 
course of his academic career in the United States.
111
 
When John Wiley & Sons brought an infringement action 
against him, Kirtsaeng invoked the first sale defense under section 
109(a).
112
  Explaining that the statutory reach of the doctrine is 
unclear,
113
 the court considered three possible interpretations of 
―lawfully made under this Title‖ in section 109(a): (1) 
manufactured in the United States; (2) any work made abroad that 
receives a copyright notice, which signifies that the work is subject 
to protection under Title 17
114
; or (3) lawfully made under this 
title, if this title had been applicable.
115
  Because the Copyright Act 
uses these formulations of the phrase ―lawfully made under this 
title‖ in other subsections, Kirtsaeng had urged the court that these 
subsections provided alternate interpretations of the phrase.
116
  
However, the Second Circuit concluded that to discuss these 
 
 108 654 F.3d 210, 224 (2d Cir. 2011). 
 109 Id. at 213. 
 110 Id.  
 111 See id. at 215.  The books published domestically by John Wiley & Sons markets 
often had the same or similar content as the books published by its foreign subsidiary 
specifically for the Asian markets. Id. at 213. 
 112 Id. at 214. 
 113 Id. at 219 (―In arriving at a satisfactory textual interpretation of the statutory 
language at issue, we focus primarily on the words ‗made‘ and ‗under,‘ but this task is 
complicated by two factors: (1) the word ‗made‘ is not a term of art in the Copyright Act, 
and (2) ‗[t]he word under is [a] chameleon‘ and courts ‗must draw its meaning from its 
context.‘‖). 
114  Id. at 220 n. 38 (referencing 17 U.S.C. § 401 (2006)).  Section 401(a) discusses the 
notice of copyright affixed to a copyrighted work manufactured abroad under the 
authorization of a copyright holder.  
 115 Id. (referencing 17 U.S.C. § 602(b) (2006)).  Section 602(b) prohibits the 
importation of goods that would have been infringing goods under the Copyright Act, had 
the Copyright Act been applicable.   
116  Id. 
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possible meanings of section 109(a) in a vacuum could lead to a 
conflict with the infringing importation clause of the Copyright 
Act.
117
   
Concerned over possible tension between sections 602(a) and 
109(a), the Second Circuit revisited the Quality King dicta, where 
the Supreme Court had explained ways in which section 109(a) 
and section 602(a) do and do not overlap.
118
  The hypothetical 
given in Quality King suggested that as a result of the tension 
between the two sections, foreign manufactured copyrighted 
material could not be subject to section 109(a).
119
  Moreover, the 
Second Circuit found that Kirtsaeng presented a similar set of facts 
to the Quality King hypothetical in which only the copies made by 
the United States publisher would be ―lawfully made under [Title 
17].‖120  Following the hypothetical, the Second Circuit held that 
this phrase means ―made in territories in which the Copyright Act 
is law.‖121  Therefore, the first sale defense is not available for 
foreign manufactured goods such as Kirtsaeng‘s textbooks.122 
Kirtsaeng, however, was not decided without a dissenting 
opinion.  Judge Garvan Murtha reasoned that, in keeping with 
other sections in Title 17, the text of 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) should not 
actually refer to a place of manufacture.
123
  Because both common 
law policy and prior incarnations of the 1976 Act had been silent 
on the importance of place of origin with respect to the limitations 
of the first sale defense, Judge Murtha explained that there is no 
reason to assume that Congress intended to limit the applicability 
of section 109(a) by geographic place of manufacture.
124
  
According to his dissent, an application of the first sale doctrine 
only to domestically manufactured goods would create economic 
uncertainty and high transaction costs in the secondary market.
125
  
 
 117 Id.; see 17 U.S.C. § 602(a) (2006).  
 118 Kirtsaeng, 654 F.3d at 218 (quoting Quality King Distribs., Inc. v. L‘anza Research 
Int‘l, Inc., 523 U.S. 135, 148 (1998)); see also supra Part II.B.1.  
 119 Kirtsaeng, 654 F.3d at 218. 
 120 Id. at 222. 
 121 Id. 
 122 Id. 
 123 Id. at 226 (Murtha, J., dissenting). 
 124 Id. at 227. 
 125 Id. at 227–28. 
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Anyone attempting to resell a copyrighted item would have to 
search for the origin of that item, which for some goods would 
prove impossible.
126
  Moreover, Judge Murtha recognized that the 
Second Circuit‘s reading of section 109(a) grants a manufacturer 
the unlimited power to control future sales and dispositions of her 
work.
127
  This practice gives preferential treatment to copyright 
holders who outsource manufacturing to overseas locations, and 
thus incentivizes manufacturing to move abroad.
128
  The dissent 
endorses the development of an exception to the general rule that 
section 109(a) applies only to domestically manufactured goods, 
such as the one that has been in effect in the Ninth Circuit.
129
   
The arguments provided by Judge Murtha in his dissent 
parallel some of the arguments raised in a previous decision in the 
Southern District of New York, Pearson Education, Inc. v. Liu.
130
 
Liu presented a similar set of facts as Kirtsaeng.  In Liu, the 
defendant had been using Internet marketplaces to resell textbooks 
in the United States that had been manufactured abroad for the 
purpose of distribution exclusively in foreign markets.
131
  Like 
Judge Murtha, the Southern District considered the legislative 
history and intent of section 109(a) and reasoned that a broader 
interpretation of the statute, one that would allow the defense to be 
used when the goods at issue were manufactured abroad, was 
appropriate under certain circumstances.
132
  Specifically, the Liu 
court determined that a copy should be subject to United States 
copyright law (and thus, should be considered ―lawfully made‖) 
(1) if it is manufactured by the copyright holder, (2) if the 
copyright holder authorized the manufacture of the good, or (3) if 
the manufacturer‘s activities would be protected by the fair use 
doctrine under section 107 of the Copyright Act.
133
  The court also 
 
126  Id. 
 127 Id. 
 128 Id. 
 129 Id. at 228 (citing Denbicare U.S.A. Inc. v. Toys ―R‖ Us, Inc., 84 F.3d 1143 (9th Cir. 
1996)). 
 130 656 F. Supp. 2d 407 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
 131 Id. at 408. 
 132 Id. at 412–15. 
 133 Id. at 412–13.  The fair use doctrine, codified at 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006), states as 
follows:  
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discussed the policy justifications of reading section 109(a) to 
apply to foreign manufactured goods so long as a sale authorized 
by the copyright holder has occurred.
134
  However, despite 
enumerating reasons for holding that the first sale doctrine should 
be available to Liu and other similarly situated defendants, the 
Southern District held that it was bound by the dicta in Quality 
King.
135
  For this reason, it ultimately held that ―lawfully made 
under this Title‖ refers exclusively to domestically manufactured 
goods.
136
 
Several cases bearing fact patterns similar to Kirtsaeng and Liu 
have come before the Southern District of New York and the 
Second Circuit in the past few years.
137
  Again, bound by stare 
decisis, the Second Circuit based its holding in Pearson Education, 
Inc., v. Yadav on the decision in Kirtsaeng.
138
  Similarly, in 
Pearson Education, Inc. v. Arora, the Southern District, citing Liu, 
reiterated that the first sale doctrine applies only to domestically 
manufactured goods.
139
  These cases followed the Second Circuit‘s 
narrow reading of the first sale doctrine, albeit 
 
Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A, the fair use 
of a copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies 
or phonorecords or by any other means specified by that section, for 
purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching 
(including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or 
research, is not an infringement of copyright. In determining whether 
the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair use the factors 
to be considered shall include— 
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use 
is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; 
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work; 
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the 
copyrighted work as a whole; and 
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the 
copyrighted work. 
The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of 
fair use if such finding is made upon consideration of all the above 
factors. 
 134 Liu, 656 F. Supp. 2d at 413–14. 
 135 Id. at 415–16.  
 136 Id. 
 137 See generally, e.g., Pearson Educ., Inc. v. Yadav, 2011 WL 4348010 (2d Cir. 2011); 
Pearson Educ., Inc. v. Arora, 717 F. Supp. 2d 374 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
 138 See generally Yadav, 2011 WL 4348010. 
 139 Arora, 717 F. Supp. 2d at 379 & n.39. 
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unenthusiastically,
140
 admitting the courts‘ inability to upset prior 
holdings in the circuit.
141
 
3. The Perpetual Control Problem and the Ninth Circuit‘s 
Carve-out 
Although Quality King has been used as instructive in the 
Second Circuit, the Ninth Circuit has expressed disfavor of such 
limited holdings.  Beginning with BMG Music v. Perez,
142
 Parfums 
Givenchy, Inc. v. Drug Emporium, Inc.,
143
 and eventually 
Denbicare U.S.A., Inc. v. Toys “R” Us, Inc.,144 the Ninth Circuit 
articulated, in its interpretation of ―lawfully made under this title,‖ 
a carve-out that makes section 109(a) applicable to foreign 
manufactured goods if the copyright holder sells or provides its 
authorization to sell those goods within the United States.
145
  
Justice Ginsburg likely had these cases in mind when she 
cautioned that Quality King addressed only the first sale doctrine‘s 
applicability to domestically manufactured gray market goods and 
she emphasized the hypothetical‘s status as dicta—not law.146    
For this reason, Quality King did not govern the Ninth Circuit‘s 
exception, which applies in cases where the arbitraged goods are 
manufactured abroad.
147
 
The first of the cases to develop this exception was BMG 
Music v. Perez, which held that a first sale of foreign manufactured 
goods abroad would be insufficient to trigger the first sale 
defense.
148
  In BMG Music, the defendant faced an infringement 
action by the copyright holder, claiming that he had purchased 
copyrighted sound recordings abroad and imported them for 
 
140  Liu provides the most extreme example, with Judge Holwell explaining all the 
reasons why a narrow holding would produce undesirable practical results, but then 
reasoning that the Supreme Court‘s dicta holds the greatest weight in determining the 
outcome of this type of case. See Liu, 656 F. Supp. 2d at 415. 
 141 See Arora, 717 F. Supp. 2d at 379 & n.39. 
 142 952 F.2d 318 (9th Cir. 1991). 
 143 38 F.3d 477 (9th Cir. 1994). 
 144 84 F.3d 1143 (9th Cir. 1996). 
 145 See id. at 1150. 
 146 Quality King Distribs., Inc. v. L‘anza Research Int‘l, Inc., 523 U.S. 135, 154 (1998) 
(Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
 147 See Denbicare, 84 F.3d at 1150; Givenchy, 38 F.3d at 481; BMG Music, 952 F.2d at 
319. 
 148 BMG Music, 952 F.2d at 319. 
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commercial resale in the United States.
149
  Following an earlier 
case in the Third Circuit, Columbia Broadcasting Systems v. 
Scorpio Music Distributors, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that if 
section 109(a) was construed as a defense to the importation right 
―superseding the prohibition on importation set forth in the more 
recently enacted § 602 would render § 602 virtually 
meaningless.‖150  Thus, following Scorpio, BMG Music held that 
the first sale doctrine does not provide a defense for goods 
manufactured abroad because the phrase ―lawfully made under this 
Title‖ limits the defense ―to copies legally made and sold in the 
United States.‖151  Although, roughly speaking, this understanding 
of the rule reflects the general rule propagated in all circuits today, 
here, the Ninth Circuit erroneously inserted ―and sold‖ into its 
understanding of ―lawfully made under this Title,‖ and thus opened 
the door for a holding that a sale by the copyright owner in the 
United States is sufficient to make an item ―lawfully made under 
this Title.‖152 
 Using this line of reasoning, Parfums Givenchy, Inc. v. Drug 
Emporium, Inc. provided the Ninth Circuit with a chance to 
continue developing a justification for how it would apply the first 
sale doctrine to gray market goods.
153
  In France, Givenchy 
produced, marketed, and sold boxes for Givenchy perfumes to 
Givenchy USA, its American subsidiary.
154
  Givenchy USA 
recorded the design of the box with the United States Copyright 
Office and obtained a copyright certificate.
155
  Drug Emporium 
began buying the perfume from third party importers in the United 
States and marketing the goods in their original packaging.
156
  
Agreeing with Givenchy USA‘s argument, the Ninth Circuit held 
 
149  Id.  
 150 Id. at 319–20; CBS, Inc. v. Scorpio Music Distribs., Inc., 569 F. Supp. 47, 49–50 
(E.D. Pa. 1983) (holding that ―lawfully made under this Title‖ means made in the United 
States). 
 151 BMG Music, 952 F.2d at 319 (emphasis added). 
 152 Id. 
 153 See Givenchy, 38 F.3d at 481 (holding that the first sale doctrine does not apply to 
foreign manufactured goods unless and until a first sale has occurred in the United 
States). 
 154 Id. at 479. 
 155 Id. 
 156 Id. 
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that the first sale doctrine will not apply to foreign manufactured 
goods unless and until there has been a first sale authorized by the 
copyright holder in the United States.
157
  In Givenchy, the 
importing third parties had purchased the perfume from Givenchy 
in France.
158
  Thus, because no first sale under the copyright 
holder‘s authority had occurred domestically, Drug Emporium was 
unable to use the first sale defense provided by section 109(a).
159
  
After Givenchy, it was clear that the first sale doctrine could not be 
triggered if no sale, authorized by the copyright holder, had 
occurred within the United States.  As in BMG Music, this 
understanding of the statute does not stray very far from the 
general rule surrounding section 109(a).
160
  However, this reading 
of the rule gave the Ninth Circuit the opportunity to affirmatively 
articulate, within its interpretation of ―lawfully made under this 
title,‖ the exception for foreign made goods sold domestically 
under the copyright holder‘s consent.161 
Denbicare U.S.A., Inc. v. Toys “R” Us, Inc., a case decided 
two years after Givenchy, marked a definitive shift in the Ninth 
Circuit‘s first sale doctrine jurisprudence.162  There, the court held 
that the sale of a foreign manufactured good by the copyright 
owner or with his authority in the United States (or in a United 
States foreign trading zone) would be sufficient to bring section 
109(a) into play, even if the good is manufactured abroad.
163
  Thus 
Denbicare eliminated the need for a domestic sale in order to 
trigger the first sale defense; after this case, if the seller was the 
foreign copyright holder, the defense applied once that foreign 
seller sold to a domestic purchaser.  Denbicare recognized the 
―widespread criticism‖ of applying section 109(a) only to goods 
manufactured in the United States.
164
  In each case, the Ninth 
Circuit acknowledged that the practical result—providing a 
copyright holder with control over even the tenth sale of a good—
 
 157 Id. at 481.  
 158 Id.  
 159 Id.  
 160 BMG Music v. Perez, 952 F.2d 318, 319–20 (9th Cir. 1991). 
 161 Givenchy, 38 F.3d at 481. 
 162 84 F.3d 1143 (9th Cir. 1996). 
 163 Id. at 1150. 
 164 Id. at 1149–50. 
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would be untenable and out of sync with the legislative history and 
text of the Copyright Act.
165
  For this reason, Denbicare 
announced the domestic sale exception within its interpretation of 
―lawfully made under this title,‖ and effectively limited the holding 
of BMG Music to its facts.
166
 
The phrase ―lawfully made under this Title‖ and the first sale 
doctrine‘s applicability to foreign manufactured goods returned to 
the Ninth Circuit in Omega, S.A. v. Costco Wholesale Corp.
167
  In 
Omega, the discount club Costco Wholesale purchased Swiss-
manufactured Omega ―Seamaster‖ watches from a New York 
company, which had purchased the watches from third parties, 
which in turn had purchased the watches abroad from an 
authorized distributor.
168
  Costco began reselling the watches for 
$1,299.99 though they retailed in the United States for $1,995.
169
  
Although Omega had authorized the original sale of the watches to 
the foreign distributor, it had authorized neither the watches‘ 
importation into the United States nor the sales made by Costco.
170
  
Once Omega received complaints from authorized distributors 
about Costco‘s steeply discounted sales of the watches, it placed a 
copyrighted Omega Globe Design on the underside of the 
watches.
171
  Omega was then able to file a copyright infringement 
 
 165 Id. at 1150. 
 166 Id. at 1149–50 (discussing BMG Music v. Perez, 952 F.2d 318 (9th Cir. 1991)).  
 167 541 F.3d 982, 985 (9th Cir. 2008).  To avoid confusion with the Supreme Court‘s 
decision with the same name, the Ninth Circuit‘s decision is referred to as Omega in the 
body of this Note.  The Supreme Court decision will be referred to as Costco. See Costco 
Wholesale Corp. v. Omega, S.A., 131 S. Ct. 565 (2010).  
 168 Omega, 541 F.3d at 984. 
 169 See Omega, S.A. v. Costco Wholesale Corp., CV 04-05443 TJH, slip op. at 1 (E.D. 
Cal. Nov. 9, 2011). 
 170 Omega, 541 F.3d at 984.  
 171 See Omega, CV 04-05443 TJH, slip op. at 2.  
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action under sections 106(3) and 602(a).
172
  Costco filed a cross-
motion under section 109(a).
173
 
 Citing Quality King‘s dicta discussing the relationship 
between section 109(a) and section 602(a), the Ninth Circuit 
explained that the type of importation prohibited by section 602(a) 
would be ―merely a subcategory‖ of an infringement of the 
distribution right.
174
  Thus, it held that generally, section 109(a) 
can provide a defense against a section 602(a) claim to the extent 
that the claim involves a domestically made copyrighted item.
175
  
Moreover, the Omega court explained that a product cannot be 
―lawfully made under this Title‖ simply by virtue of its 
manufacture by a United States copyright holder, but that an 
additional, affirmative step is required, such as the manufacture of 
the items in the United States.
176
  Domestically manufactured 
goods are undoubtedly covered by the first sale doctrine, but the 
Seamaster watches had been manufactured in Switzerland and first 
sold by the copyright holder abroad.
177
  Thus, because it was 
factually similar to BMG Music, the Ninth Circuit did not consider 
the domestic sale exception.
178
   
 The Omega court held that the rule that the first sale doctrine 
generally does not apply to foreign manufactured goods remained 
in place.
179
  It also recognized the possibility that the exception 
articulated by Givenchy and Denbicare for domestic sales of 
foreign manufactured goods may not have survived Quality 
 
172   Omega, 541 F.3d at 984.  In its current form, the Copyright Act provides no 
protection for watch design.  However, jewelry design is protected because of its 
relationship to sculpture. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(5) (2006).  Omega‘s watches themselves 
were not protected by copyright law due to the generic appearance of the timepieces.  
Interestingly, although the proposed Innovative Design Protection and Piracy Prevention 
Act (IDPPPA) would provide copyright protection for fashion design including 
accessories such as handbags, belts, and eyeglass frames, watch design is not included in 
this bill. See H.R. 2511, 112th Cong. § 2(a)(2)(B) (2011). 
 173 See Omega, 541 F.3d at 985 (referring to Quality King Distribs., Inc. v. L‘Anza 
Research Int‘l, Inc., 523 U.S. 135, 144–45 (1998)). 
 174 Id. 
 175 Id. at 988. 
 176 Id. at 989–90. 
 177 Id. 
 178 Id. at 990. 
 179 Id. 
2012]  SEAMASTER-ING THE FIRST SALE DOCTRINE 911 
 
King.
180
  However, given the opportunity to resolve the question, 
the Supreme Court simply affirmed the Ninth Circuit in a 4-4 
decision without an opinion and left lingering the question of the 
first sale doctrine‘s applicability to foreign manufactured goods.181 
The Ninth Circuit justifies its exception on the basis of policy 
and legislative history.
182
  According to the Ninth Circuit, the 
outcome of a narrow holding like the Second Circuit‘s—giving 
manufacturers of foreign made goods perpetual control over their 
works—would be so undesirable that goods manufactured abroad 
should be made subject to the first sale doctrine under certain 
circumstances.
183
  However, the carve-out read into section 109(a) 
by the Ninth Circuit still produces impractical consequences for 
goods manufactured and sold abroad, such as providing a 
copyright holder with control over distribution of its goods 
following their sale and thus incentivizing the outsourcing of 
manufacturing to foreign locations. 
This consequence was exemplified by the decision on remand 
in Omega,
184
 where the Eastern District of California, in November 
2011, permitted Costco to use a new defense against Omega‘s 
infringement action.
185
  Omega conceded that its purpose in 
placing the copyrighted Omega Globe Design on the watch was to 
invoke section 602(a) and thereby control the importation and sales 
of the watches.
186
  As a result, the Eastern District found that 
Omega had committed copyright misuse, which is a defense to any 
 
 180 Id. 
 181 Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Omega, S.A., 131 S. Ct. 565 (2010).  Justice Kagan 
recused herself due to her previous involvement with the case as Solicitor General. See 
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 1, Costco 
Wholesale Corp. v. Omega, S.A., 131 S. Ct. 565 (2010) (No. 08-1423), 2010 WL 
3512773. 
 182 See Denbicare U.S.A. Inc. v. Toys ―R‖ Us Inc., 84 F.3d 1143, 1149–50 (9th Cir. 
1996). 
 183 Id. 
 184 See Omega, S.A. v. Costco Wholesale Corp., CV 04-05443 TJH, at 3 (E.D. Cal. 
Nov. 9, 2011) (holding that the plaintiff‘s infringement action under sections 106(3) and 
602(a) was barred by copyright misuse). 
 185 Id.  
 186 Id.  
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copyright infringement action.
187
  Although the application of this 
concept outside of antitrust law or tying arrangements in copyright 
law is relatively new, the Eastern District of California‘s decision 
was based on precedent from the Ninth and Fourth Circuits.
188
  The 
court found that misuse occurs when copyright is used in a way 
that violates the public policy objectives of copyright law.  
Moreover, a misuse defense functions similarly to the first sale 
defense by preventing copyright holders from leveraging a 
monopoly to control areas outside of that monopoly.
189
 
II. CONFLICT: UNDER WHAT STANDARD DOES THE FIRST SALE 
DOCTRINE APPLY TO FOREIGN MANUFACTURED GOODS? 
―As demonstrated by the decades-old tension in circuit-law, 
reasonable jurists can, and do, disagree about the first-sale 
doctrine’s application to copies manufactured abroad.‖190   
The Ninth Circuit and the Second Circuit agree that in section 
109(a) of the Copyright Act, Congress uses the phrase ―lawfully 
made under this Title‖ to describe items manufactured in the 
United States.
191
  In both circuits, the reseller of a foreign 
manufactured good generally will not succeed if she raises the first 
sale defense in an infringing importation action under section 
602(a).
192
  However, the Ninth Circuit provides an exception to 
this rule: a foreign manufactured good may be subjected to the first 
sale doctrine if it is sold under the authorization of a copyright 
holder in the United States.
193
  The standard for determining 
whether the defendant in each case may successfully raise the first 
sale defense when faced with an infringement suit for importing 
 
 187 Id. (―[C]opyright misuse is an equitable defense to copyright infringement, the 
contours of which are still being defined.‖ (quoting MDY LLC v. Blizzard 
Entertainment, Inc., 629 F.3d 928, 941 (9th Cir. 2010)). 
 188 See id. (citing A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc. 239 F.3d 1004, 1026 (9th Cir. 
2001); Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 978 (4th Cir. 1990)). 
 189 See id.  
 190 Pearson Educ., Inc. v. Liu, 656 F. Supp. 2d 407, 416 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).  
 191 See John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Kirtsaeng, 654 F.3d 210, 219 (2d Cir. 2011), cert 
granted, 80 U.S.L.W. 3365 (U.S. Apr. 16, 2012) (No. 11-697); Omega, S.A. v. Costco 
Wholesale Corp., 541 F.3d 982, 986 (9th Cir. 2008).  
192  See supra note 192 and accompanying text (discussing cases from both circuits). 
 193 See Denbicare U.S.A. Inc. v. Toys ―R‖ Us Inc., 84 F.3d 1143, 1150 (9th Cir. 1996). 
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foreign manufactured goods thus differs by circuit.  This is in part 
because, in drawing the geographic boundaries of section 109(a), 
the Second Circuit and the Ninth Circuit each focus on a different 
portion of ―lawfully made under this Title‖ as the operative part of 
the phrase.
194
  Therefore, key facts in each case, such as the 
location of the first sale of the goods in question, weigh 
differently.
195
  The outcome of each case is thus both fact- and 
circuit-specific.
196
 
In the Second Circuit, the applicability of the first sale doctrine 
is governed by a bright line rule—the defense is completely 
unavailable to resellers of foreign manufactured goods.
197
  The 
most recent cases heard by the Second Circuit, namely Kirtsaeng 
and the Pearson cases, hold that ―lawfully made under this Title‖ 
must be interpreted to mean ―made in the United States.‖198  
Although the court began its textual interpretation by focusing on 
the words ―made‖ and ―under,‖ it eventually decided that because 
these words are not terms of art, the phrase must draw meaning 
 
 194 Compare Denbicare, 84 F.3d at 1150, with Kirtsaeng, 654 F.3d at 222. 
 195 See, e.g., Kirtsaeng, 654 F.3d at 222. 
196  When this Note went to print, the Supreme Court had recently granted certiorari to 
Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc..  In the October 2012 term, the Supreme Court will 
review how section 109(a) and 602(a) apply to a copyrighted item that was manufactured 
and legally obtained abroad and then imported into the United States for resale. 
Specifically, the Court will look to answer the following three questions:  
Can such a foreign-made product never be resold within the United 
States without the copyright owner‘s permission, as the Second 
Circuit held in this case? Can such a foreign-made product sometimes 
be resold within the United States without permission, but only after 
the owner approves an earlier sale in this country, as the Ninth 
Circuit held in Costco? Or can such a product always be resold 
without permission within the United States, so long as the copyright 
owner authorized the first sale abroad, as the Third Circuit has 
indicated?  
See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., No. 11-697 
(Dec. 2, 2011); see also Lyle Denniston, Orders: One New Grant, on Copyright, 
SCOTUSBLOG (Apr. 16, 2012), http://www.scotusblog.com/?p=143279; Anandashankar 
Mazumdar, High Court Decides to Revisit First Sale Issue Left Hanging by 4-4 
Deadlock, PATENT, TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT LAW DAILY (Apr. 17, 2012), 
http://www.bna.com/high-court-decides-n12884908971/. 
 197 Id.; see also Pearson Educ., Inc. v. Yadav, No. 10-2610-CV, 2011 WL 4348010 (2d 
Cir. Sept. 19, 2011); Pearson Educ., Inc. v. Arora, 717 F. Supp. 2d 374, 379 (S.D.N.Y. 
2010); Pearson Educ., Inc. v. Liu, 656 F. Supp. 2d 407, 416 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).  
 198 Kirtsaeng, 654 F.3d at 219. 
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from its context.
199
  Specifically, it interprets the phrase by 
studying the interaction between section 109(a) and section 
602(a).
200
  This circuit finds that the coverage of section 602(a) is 
broader than the coverage of section 109(a) because, as the part of 
the statute that identifies infringing importations, section 602(a) 
encompasses ―copies that were ‗lawfully made‘ . . . under the law 
of some other country‖ in addition to piratical copies.201  Under 
any other interpretation, section 602(a) would be redundant.
202
 
Moreover, compared to its Ninth Circuit counterpart, the 
Second Circuit relied more heavily on the dicta in Quality King for 
the purpose of interpreting section 109(a).
203
  First, Kirtsaeng and 
the Pearson cases involved a set of facts similar to the hypothetical 
given in Quality King.
204
  In both the hypothetical and in the cases 
reviewed by the Second Circuit, a foreign manufacturer and a 
domestic manufacturer each held distribution rights in his 
respective territory.
205
  There was an attempt in both scenarios to 
sell in the United States a book that was manufactured abroad 
exclusively for foreign distribution.
206
  The Quality King 
hypothetical predicts an outcome for this type of situation: only the 
copies made by the publisher of the United States edition are 
―lawfully made under this Title‖ and thus the first sale doctrine 
does not provide the publisher of the foreign edition with a defense 
to a 602(a) action.
207
  Using this reasoning, Kirtsaeng, Liu, Yadav, 
and Arora all set forth the same narrow precedent—the first sale 
 
 199 Id. at 220–21. 
 200 Quality King Distribs., Inc. v. L‘anza Research Int‘l, Inc., 523 U.S. 135, 147 (1998); 
see also Kirtsaeng, 654 F.3d at 221; Liu, 656 F. Supp. 2d at 415. 
 201 Kirtsaeng, 654 F.3d at 221. 
 202 See id.; see also Yadav, 2011 WL 4348010; Arora, 717 F. Supp. 2d at 379; Liu, 656 
F. Supp. 2d at 415–16. 
 203 See Kirtsaeng, 654 F.3d at 221–22; Liu, 656 F. Supp. 2d at 415–16; see also Yadav, 
2011 WL 4348010; Arora, 717 F. Supp. 2d at 379. 
 204 See Yadav, 2011 WL 4348010; Kirtsaeng, 654 F.3d at 212–13; Arora, 717 F. Supp. 
2d at 375–76; Liu, 656 F. Supp. 2d at 408. 
 205 See Yadav, 2011 WL 4348010; Kirtsaeng, 654 F.3d at 213; Arora, 717 F. Supp. 2d 
at 376; Liu, 656 F. Supp. 2d at 408. 
 206 Quality King Distribs., Inc. v. L‘anza Research Int‘l, Inc., 523 U.S. 135, 148 (1998); 
Kirtsaeng, 654 F.3d at 218. 
 207 See Yadav, 2011 WL 4348010; Kirtsaeng, 654 F.3d at 222; Arora, 717 F. Supp. 2d 
at 379; Liu, 656 F. Supp. 2d at 416. 
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doctrine is absolutely unavailable in infringement cases involving 
gray market goods manufactured abroad. 
In the Ninth Circuit, however, the same goods may qualify for 
the first sale defense if the copyright holder has sold or has 
authorized a sale of the goods in the United States.
208
  Even if the 
goods were not literally ―made under this Title,‖ they could 
become subject to Title 17 provisions through a domestic sale 
authorized by the United States copyright holder and thus fall 
within the bounds of the first sale doctrine.
209
  Case law preceding 
Omega and Quality King explained that ―lawfully made under this 
Title‖ presents a legal rather than a geographic boundary, 
emphasizing a good‘s lawfulness as the purpose of that phrase 
within section 109(a).
210
  This rationale led to the creation of the 
Denbicare exception, which hypothesized that a foreign made 
good could be made ―lawful‖ for the purposes of the first sale 
doctrine if subjected to a sale by the copyright holder in the United 
States.
211
  Regardless of this exception, the most recent discussion 
on section 109(a) by the Ninth Circuit, in Omega, determined (like 
the Second Circuit) that ―lawfully made under this Title‖ means 
manufactured in the United States.
212
  
It is important to note that in the Ninth Circuit case, Omega 
argued that Quality King had eliminated the Denbicare 
exception.
213
  However, the Ninth Circuit did not evaluate this 
argument because the Denbicare exception was not relevant to 
facts of the case.  In Omega, the watches showcasing the Omega 
Globe Design had been sold in the United States without Omega‘s 
authority, and, as a result, the first sale doctrine did not apply.
214
  
Upon appeal to the Supreme Court, the Court affirmed the Ninth‘s 
Circuit‘s decision without an opinion,215 so the Denbicare 
exception remains untested. 
 
 208 See Denbicare U.S.A. Inc. v. Toys ―R‖ Us, Inc., 84 F.3d 1143, 1150 (9th Cir. 1996). 
 209 Id. 
 210 Omega, S.A. v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 541 F.3d 982, 985 (9th Cir. 2008) 
(discussing earlier cases). 
 211 Id. at 990. 
 212 Id. 
 213 Id.  
 214 Id. 
 215 Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Omega, S.A., 131 S. Ct. 565 (2010). 
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III. NEW ALTERNATIVES 
A. The Second Circuit’s Approach Produces a Problem of 
Perpetual Control 
Both approaches taken by the circuit courts are problematic.  
The Second Circuit bases its rule on the British publisher 
hypothetical in Quality King, which has only the force of dicta.  
Justice Ginsburg cautioned against reliance on that very 
hypothetical because Quality King did not involve or ask the Court 
to address foreign manufactured goods.
216
  Moreover, the 
hypothetical is subject to more than one interpretation.  Although 
the Second Circuit seems to have understood the hypothetical to 
explain that domestically produced copies are always physically 
manufactured within the jurisdiction of the Copyright Act, whereas 
foreign produced copies never are, a different interpretation could 
suggest that copies are excluded from United States Copyright law 
when the foreign copyright holder‘s distribution right is limited to 
countries other than the United States.
217
  The latter understanding 
of the rule could minimize the undesirable practical consequences 
discussed by the Ninth Circuit if it is limited in some way. 
Moreover, the Quality King hypothetical may be factually 
distinguished from Kirtsaeng and the Pearson cases in the Second 
Circuit, and thus these distinctions corroborate an alternative 
interpretation.  First, in the scenario presented by the Supreme 
Court, the British publisher—who presumably has distribution 
rights to the copyrighted items in England only—attempts a sale in 
the United States.
218
  The Quality King Court correctly identifies 
this as the type of infringement that section 602(a) intends to 
prevent and is therefore not protected under section 109(a).  It is 
possible that in Quality King, the Court articulated the British 
publisher hypothetical in order to protect foreign markets and 
distribution from interference by U.S. copyright law.  But the 
Court never discussed the statutes‘ interactions if a transferee, like 
 
 216 See Quality King Distribs., Inc. v. L‘anza Research Int‘l, Inc., 523 U.S. 135, 154 
(1998) (Ginsburg, J., concurring); Samuel Brooks, Note, Battling Gray Markets Through 
Copyright Law: Omega, S.A. v. Costco Wholesale Corporation, 2010 BYU L. REV. 19, 
26 (2010). 
 217 See infra note 218 and accompanying text.  
 218 17 U.S.C. § 109 (2006) (emphasis added). 
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Kirtsaeng or Pearson, as opposed to a party holding distribution 
rights, is the party performing the sale.  Neither the Second Circuit 
nor the Ninth Circuit considers this distinction in any of the 
decisions.  Section 109 is specifically titled ―Limitations on 
Exclusive Rights: Effect of Transfer of Particular Copy or 
Phonorecord.‖219  To illustrate, in Kirtsaeng, the foreign distributor 
had no role in the allegedly infringing sales.
220
  A transfer of the 
copyrighted item by the owner of the foreign distribution rights 
had already occurred and the copyright holder, even if abroad, had 
already received full consideration for the copy.
221
  Both the 
copyright holder and the foreign distributor had lawfully earned 
the profit they were owed.  A sale by Kirtsaeng, by the defendants 
in the Pearson cases, or even by Costco, is more likely the type of 
sale that section 109(a) intends to protect, as opposed to a domestic 
sale by a foreign distributor.  For this reason, the Second Circuit in 
Kirtsaeng and the Pearson cases arguably has overstated the 
relevance of the Quality King hypothetical. 
Furthermore, while the bright-line interpretation may be 
faithful to a literal reading of the copyright statute and to Supreme 
Court dicta, the Second Circuit‘s application of the first sale 
doctrine produces undesirable practical consequences because it 
provides a copyright holder with perpetual control over any of its 
goods that are manufactured abroad.  The ability to control future 
sales of goods provides an incentive beyond lower production 
costs associated with moving manufacturing overseas.  Despite 
deciding in favor of an absolute rule, judges in the Second Circuit 
have expressed discomfort with the rule in part because of this 
 
 219 See John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Kirtsaeng, 654 F.3d 210, 213 (2d Cir. 2011), cert 
granted, 80 U.S.L.W. 3365 (U.S. Apr. 16, 2012) (No. 11-697); Pearson Educ., Inc. v. 
Yadav, No. 10-2610-CV, 2011 WL 4348010 (2d Cir. Sept. 19, 2011); Pearson Educ., Inc. 
v. Arora, 717 F. Supp. 2d 374, 376 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); Pearson Educ., Inc. v. Liu, 656 F. 
Supp. 2d 407, 408 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
 220 Brief of Amici Curiae Entm‘t Merchs. Ass‘n & Nat‘l Ass‘n of Recording 
Merchandisers in Support of Reversal at 11–12, John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Kirtsaeng, 
654 F.3d 210 (2d Cir. 2011) (No. 09-4896-cv), 2010 WL 6351493.  As EMA‘s amicus 
brief indicates, in the Quality King oral argument, the Supreme Court mentions that the 
phrase ―lawfully made under this Title‖ includes copies that are made either under U.S. 
copyright law, or with the authorization of a U.S. copyright holder. Id. (citing Transcript 
of Oral Argument at 11–12, Quality King Distribs., Inc. v. L‘anza Research Int‘l, Inc. 
(1998) (No. 96-1470)). 
 221 See Kirtsaeng, 654 F.3d at 227 (Murtha, J., dissenting); Liu, 656 F. Supp. 2d at 416. 
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effect.
222
  Judge Murtha‘s dissent in Kirtsaeng, for example, 
recommended that because of these consequences, the first sale 
doctrine should apply to any work protected by U.S. copyright law, 
regardless of its place of manufacture.
223
  Similarly, despite having 
prefaced his opinion with a nearly exhaustive explanation of 
arguments in favor of allowing the first sale doctrine to apply to 
foreign manufactured goods in some capacity, Judge Holwell in 
Pearson v. Liu reluctantly limited ―lawfully made under this Title‖ 
to ―refer to the jurisdiction in which a copy is manufactured‖—
specifically, the United States, because of the Quality King 
hypothetical.
224
  According to the Second Circuit, the Supreme 
Court in Quality King had already spoken directly to whether the 
first sale doctrine applies to copies manufactured abroad and thus 
the court was bound by this reasoning. 
B. The Ninth Circuit’s Approach Provides an Imperfect Solution 
to the Perpetual Control Problem but Distorts the Statute 
The Ninth Circuit‘s carve-out addresses, to some extent, the 
perpetual control problem created by a holding like the Second 
Circuit‘s.  However, the exception is also problematic because it 
created a new standard that lacks a statutory foundation.  The 
Ninth Circuit appropriated the decision of the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania in Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Scorpio 
Music Distributors, Inc.
225
  This case, without providing much 
reasoning, concluded that the first sale doctrine provides protection 
to the lawful buyer of copies manufactured and sold in the United 
States.
226
  Although read literally this interpretation may not stray 
too far from the statute, the Ninth Circuit in Denbicare later 
interpreted ―manufactured and sold‖ disjunctively—a copyrighted 
good could become lawfully made in the United States either 
through manufacture in the United States or through a domestic 
sale made or authorized by the copyright owner.
227
  However, the 
 
 222 See Kirtsaeng, 654 F.3d at 227 (Murtha, J., dissenting). 
 223 Liu, 656 F. Supp. 2d at 416. 
 224 Id. at 415. 
225  569 F. Supp. 47, 49 (E.D. Pa. 1983). 
226  Id.  
 227 See Denbicare U.S.A. Inc., v. Toys ―R‖ Us, Inc., 84 F.3d 1143, 1149–50 (9th Cir. 
1996); see also Parfums Givenchy, Inc. v. Drug Emporium, Inc., 38 F.3d 477, 481 (9th 
Cir. 1994). 
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text of the statute does not suggest in any part that a lawful sale 
alone will suffice to ensure that an item is ―lawfully made under 
this Title.‖  The Ninth Circuit justified reading the exception into 
the statute based on ―widespread criticism‖ of the more limited 
reading of section 109(a) adopted by the Second Circuit.
228
  The 
exception would have more logical force if the Ninth Circuit had 
explained that Congress makes place of manufacture a decisive 
factor in the Copyright Act by explicitly saying so, for example, by 
using phrases such as ―under this title‖ and ―manufactured in the 
United States‖ in the same sentence, or by using more specific 
language.
229
 
Moreover, as the Omega court concluded, it is unclear whether 
the Ninth Circuit‘s exception survives Quality King.230  In Omega, 
the Ninth Circuit wavered on the validity of the exception, first 
holding that section 109(a) can provide a defense only as long as 
the claims involve domestically made copies because Quality King 
―suggests that ‗lawfully made under this title‘ refers exclusively to 
copies of U.S.-copyrighted works that are made domestically.‖231  
It later acknowledged the exception in dicta, however, and found 
that Costco would not be entitled to summary judgment, even 
under Denbicare.
232
  However, because of its factual differences 
with Denbicare and its predecessors, Quality King did not directly 
overrule this line of cases.
233
  The Ninth Circuit thus concluded 
that it did not need to address whether the Denbicare exception 
survives, given that it did not apply to the facts of the case.
234
 
Even if the Ninth Circuit sometimes prevents an untenable 
outcome by applying the first sale doctrine to foreign 
manufactured goods that have been sold domestically under the 
copyright holder‘s authorization, this exception is not foolproof.  
In Omega, for example, the first sale defense did not apply to the 
watches even though Omega had received its due consideration 
 
 228 See Denbicare, 84 F.3d at 1150. 
 229 See Amicus Curiae Brief of Costco Wholesale Corp. at 6–7, John Wiley & Sons, 
Inc. v. Kirtsaeng, 654 F.3d 210 (2d Cir. 2011) (No. 09-4896-CV), 2010 WL 6351494. 
 230 Omega, S.A. v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 541 F.3d 982, 990 (9th Cir. 2008).  
 231 Id. at 989.  
 232 Id. at 986.  
 233 Id. at 987.  
 234 Id. at 990.  
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through a first sale to a foreign distributor abroad.
235
  Despite the 
Denbicare exception, Omega was still able to prevent a sale in the 
United States by bringing an infringement action under section 
602(a).
236
  On remand, the Eastern District of California 
demonstrated its dissatisfaction with this result by finding 
copyright misuse and thereby preventing Omega from claiming 
infringement under section 602(a).
237
   
A successful defense of misuse of copyright may function in a 
similar way to the first sale doctrine, by barring a plaintiff from 
prevailing on an action for infringement of the misused 
copyright.
238
  Omega had conceded that it only placed the 
copyrighted design on the watches after it learned that Costco was 
reselling the watches at the discounted price, in hopes that 
copyright law would aid the company in preventing this type of 
unauthorized sale.
239
  The Eastern District of California‘s 
designation of copyright misuse was facilitated by the fact that 
Omega did not attempt to receive remunerations for the 
importation alone.  Although the watches were stored by a New 
York company for some time before being sold to Costco, this did 
not induce Omega to commence a legal action.
240
  It is thus evident 
that Omega was not merely looking to recover compensation that it 
had been denied due to an unlawful importation.  Rather, it seems 
more likely that Omega‘s main interest was in maintaining control 
over the channels of distribution and sale of its goods.  For this 
reason, it looked for a legal recourse after Costco had resold the 
watches, and the Eastern District of California found that Omega‘s 
use of copyright in this way was unacceptable.
241
 
 
 235 Id. 
 236 Id. 
 237 Omega S.A. v. Costco Wholesale Corp., CV 04-05443 TJH, slip op. at 3 (E.D. Cal. 
Nov. 9, 2011).  
 238 Id. at 2. 
 239 Id. 
 240 See Court’s Tie Vote Sustains Swatch Against Costco, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2010, at 
B7, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/14/business/14costco.html. 
241  Omega, CV 04-05443 TJH, slip op. at 2–3. 
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C. Copyright Misuse 
Although copyright misuse is an innovative means of providing 
gray market vendors with protection against section 602 
infringement actions, the boundaries of this area of copyright law 
are undefined.
242
  It is not clear that this is an appropriate defense 
to invoke if a gray market vendor is accused of copyright 
infringement.  The three types of copyright misuse courts have 
recognized include: (1) an offensive action aimed at limiting 
competition; (2) an attempt by the copyright holder to extend the 
scope of his copyright beyond the rights granted to him under the 
Copyright Act; and (3) offensive licensing terms used to cross the 
idea and expression divide.
243
   
One of the standards adopted in the Ninth Circuit for finding 
copyright misuse is that, broadly speaking, there must be a nexus 
between the copyright holder‘s actions and the public policy 
involved in the grant of a copyright.
244
  A copyright holder must be 
using its copyright to undermine the Constitutional goal of 
promoting innovation and expression through its use of the 
copyright.
245
  Copyright holders have disrupted these public policy 
aims in a number of ways, including, for example, by preventing 
the development of a work of research through intimidation against 
the use of non-copyrightable facts and works which a defendant 
did not own,
246
 or by forcing a user to enter an exclusive use 
contract in exchange for the licensing of its copyright.
247
 
The Eastern District of California did not provide much 
reasoning for its finding that Omega prevented a Constitutional 
goal outside of Omega‘s admission that the copyrighted symbol 
was placed on the watches in order to commence an infringement 
action, and it is not clear that other courts will adopt copyright 
misuse as a defense for these types of actions.
248
  Thus, defendants 
 
 242 See MDY Indus., 629 F.3d at 941. 
 243 See Kathryn Judge, Note, Rethinking Copyright Misuse, 57 STAN. L. REV. 901, 913 
(2004). 
 244 Id.  
 245 Shloss v. Sweeney, 515 F. Supp. 2d 1068, 1080 (N.D. Cal. 2009). 
 246 Id. at 1080–81. 
 247 See Practice Mgmt. Info. Corp. v. Am. Med. Ass‘n, 121 F.3d 516, 520 (9th Cir. 
1997). 
 248  See Omega, CV 04-05443 TJH, slip op. 
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may also consider other defenses when subjected to a section 
106(3) or 602(a) action, but these defenses are beyond the scope of 
this Note.   
D. A New Framework 
Neither the Ninth Circuit nor the Second Circuit provide a 
satisfactory solution to the interpretation of section 109(a), and it is 
unclear whether another defense would prevent a copyright holder 
from retaining perpetual control over the item.  Thus, courts should 
apply a different interpretation of section 109(a) when considering 
the first sale defense. 
One way of interpreting the first sale doctrine‘s applicability, 
which would remain faithful to the Copyright Act and to Supreme 
Court precedent while avoiding a perpetual control problem, may 
be to divide all gray market goods into one of three categories.  
The first category of goods would include only those that are 
domestically manufactured.  Under the plain text of the Copyright 
Act, the current reading of section 109(a) by the Second Circuit 
and the Ninth Circuit, and all of the cases discussed, these goods 
would always be subject to the first sale doctrine.  The rule for 
these goods is consistent with the current case law in all circuits. 
The second category of goods would include only those that 
are manufactured abroad through the authorization of a copyright 
holder and prepared for distribution in the United States as well as, 
potentially, other countries.  The first sale doctrine should also 
apply to these goods for several reasons.  First, the use of the 
defense here is in keeping with the intent of the doctrine and the 
policy reasons articulated since Bobbs-Merrill—if the copyright 
holder has manufactured the goods abroad for distribution either 
domestically or abroad, and has subsequently sold them to an 
importer, the copyright holder has received its due consideration 
for the goods.  Second, this category of goods is distinguishable 
from those proscribed from the first sale defense by the Quality 
King hypothetical.  The hypothetical suggested that goods made 
abroad by a foreign distributor exclusively for distribution would 
not be subject to the first sale doctrine, because by selling 
domestically, such a distributor would infringe on the rights of a 
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copyright holder that section 602(a) is designed to protect.
249
  
Providing protection under section 109(a) for goods manufactured 
for foreign distribution would thus conflict with the rights provided 
by sections 106(3) and 602(a).  In this category of goods, however, 
a section 109(a) defense will not come into conflict with section 
602(a) because first, the copyright holder will have implicitly 
acknowledged an importation of the goods if the goods are 
manufactured abroad but created for the American markets, and 
second, unless these goods are stolen at the point of manufacture, a 
lawful first sale to a transferee will have taken place.  Thus, the 
copyright holder‘s intentions will not have been compromised.  
Third, the application of section 109(a) to a good first sold abroad 
will not require extraterritorial application of United States law 
because the action that will bring section 109(a) into play will be a 
domestic attempt to resell the copy, which is copyrighted in the 
United States.
250
  Finally, making the first sale doctrine applicable 
to goods manufactured abroad but intended for domestic sale may 
eliminate instances of copyright misuse, as exemplified in Omega.  
Solely affixing a copyrighted symbol on an item manufactured 
abroad would no longer provide a copyright holder with perpetual 
control over sales of that item. 
The third category of gray market goods would include those 
that are manufactured by a foreign distributor for the purpose of 
distribution abroad.  For these goods, as the illustration in Quality 
King has shown,
251
 the first sale doctrine would not apply.  In these 
cases, there may or may not be a third party transferee, but whether 
one plays a role is ultimately irrelevant because, either way, a first 
sale will not have been authorized by the American copyright 
holder.  Moreover, because the final destination of these goods is 
likely foreign, the resale of these goods would still be subject to an 
infringement action under section 602(a), because an unauthorized 
importation would have taken place.  Although in theory, 
copyright holders would have perpetual control over domestic 
resales of these goods, perhaps this makes sense under the policy 
 
 249 See Quality King Distribs., Inc. v. L‘anza Research Int‘l, Inc., 523 U.S. 135, 148 
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 250 See generally Brooks, supra note 216.  
251  See 19 C.F.R. § 133.2(e) (2012). 
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rationale of the first sale doctrine and the Copyright Act as a 
whole.  If the copyright holder intends to distribute the good 
domestically, it will have done so with a different version, 
specifically the domestically produced version.  A copyright holder 
could be required by regulation to provide U.S. Customs and 
Border Patrol with a statement describing the versions made for 
exclusive distribution abroad that should be denied entry into the 
United States.  Federal regulation allows trademark holders to 
distinguish their goods at the border through Lever-rule 
protection.252  According to the Lever-rule, an owner of a 
trademark who desires to protect her brand against gray market 
imports may, on the basis of physical and material differences, 
provide Customs with a description of physical and material 
differences between those goods that may be imported and those 
that are manufactured for distribution exclusively abroad.253  A 
similar regulation could provide a means by which a copyright 
holder could establish before a court that a product bearing her 
copyright imported without her authorization, was intended for 
exclusive distribution abroad.  This way, the courts could allow a 
copyright holder to protect her brand image and promote consumer 
satisfaction by preventing sales of goods intended for use abroad, 
without eliminating competition or undermining domestic 
employment and the manufacturing industry. 
CONCLUSION 
Although this analysis refines the Supreme Court‘s 
understanding of the first sale doctrine‘s applicability, it is also an 
imperfect solution.  First, differentiating between the intended 
destinations of foreign manufactured goods creates a legal fiction.  
Although copyright holders may distinguish a good intended for 
one market from a good intended for another by demonstrating that 
specific tastes and needs have been considered in product design, 
courts will need to define a test for determining whether a good is 
created exclusively for a foreign or domestic market.  Moreover, 
this differentiation requirement is likely to result in high 
 
252  Id. 
253  Id. 
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transactional costs for smaller, independent copyright holders, as 
they will need to make substantial efforts to distinguish copies of 
their goods if they choose to sell in markets both in America and 
abroad.  Additionally, unless they do not mind an increase in gray 
market activity, copyright holders will no longer be able to 
establish a pricing differential across markets for goods that are 
identical to their counterparts sold abroad.  Ultimately, Congress 
should be responsible for clarifying the scope of the first sale 
doctrine, but until then, the courts will need to provide a more 
clearly defined standard that is faithful to the Copyright Act, but 
does not produce absurd results.  Until then, the courts will best 
promote the goals of the Copyright Act established in the 
Constitution through a categorization of gray market goods into 
domestically manufactured, manufactured abroad for distribution 
in the United States, and manufactured abroad for exclusive 
distribution abroad. 
